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The 2007–2009 economic recession was a period of fiscal crisis
that deeply affected state and local governments across the country.
Governments responded to revenue loss and poor economic conditions
through various austerity measures, among them raising taxes,
reducing or privatizing public services, declaring bankruptcy, or
implementing some form of state receivership (Anderson, 2011;
Anderson, 2012; Bowman, 2013; Coe, 2008; Kimhi, 2008). This article
analyzes the increasing use of emergencymanagement (EM) laws to re-
spond to fiscal crises and demonstrates how EM laws can have down-
stream impacts on the health and wellbeing of children and families.
Most commonly, EM laws are passed by state legislatures. When a mu-
nicipal-levelfiscal emergency arises, EM laws permit state officials, such
as the governor, to appoint a receiver, state agency, or financial control
board to oversee local (city) government. In some cases, these laws shifty; CBA, Community Benefits
tes.decision-making authority from local elected officials, such as a mayor,
city council, or school board, to a single non-elected state appointee,
called an emergencymanager. Emergencymanagers often have consid-
erable autonomy over fiscal decisions and can play a pivotal role in de-
veloping and implementing new financial and operations plans for the
city (Anderson, 2012; Loh, 2015). This paper discusses the implementa-
tion of EM laws within the State of Michigan, in part because Michigan
has used EM laws more extensively than any other state. Beginning in
2008, 10 cities in Michigan were under emergency management and
had an emergency manger in place (see Table 1).
In this paper,we begin by situating EM lawswithin a broader philos-
ophy of austerity politics. We discuss how EM reduces opportunities for
local democratic decision-making as well as public investment. We
present analysis of Census data that shows that poor individuals and ra-
cial minorities live under EM more often than more affluent or white
residents. Thus, less powerful groups absorb the costs of EM. We con-
clude with a case study that describes the mechanics through which
EMminimizes local accountability and, ultimately, the provision of pub-
lic services. We argue that these laws influence the wellbeing of chil-
dren and families, particularly within economically distressed urban
areas, in ways that are problematic and, for the most part, have been
ignored.
Table 1
Michigan Emergency Management Timeline and City Demographic Information.
Year EM Appointed City Pop. Total Black or African American
N (%)
Hispanic or Latino
N (%)
White/ Non-Hispanic
N (%)
% Living Below Federal
Poverty Level
1988 Ecorsea 12,180 4,760 (39.1) 820 (6.7) 6,459 (53.0) 25.6
1988 Hamtramcka 18,372 2,573 (14.0) 292 (1.6) 15,173 (82.6) 25.4
1989 River Rougea 11,314 3,957 (35.0) 378 (3.3) 6,874 (60.8) 29.1
1990 Royal Oak Townshipa 5,011 3,267 (65.2) 49 (1.0) 1,623 (32.4) 21.4
2000 Hamtramckb 22,976 3,430 (14.9) 300 (1.3) 14,872 (60.0) 24.1
2000 Highland Parkb 16,746 15,598 (93.1) 95 (0.6) 688 (4.0) 32.1
2002 Flintb 124,943 66,231 (53.0) 3,742 (3.0) 50,020 (40.0) 22.9
2002 Ecorseb 11,229 4,533 (40.4) 1,004 (8.9) 5,313 (47.3) 21.7
2008 Three Oaksc 2,574 26 (1.0) 76 (3.0) 2,406 (93.5) 13.2
2009 Highland Parkc 11,776 10,955 (93.0) 156 (1.3) 347 (3.0) 40.3
2011 Ecorsec 9,512 4,375 (46.0) 1,278 (13.4) 3476 (36.5) 28.4
2011 Pontiacc 59,515 30,384 (51.1) 9,835 (16.5) 15,815 (26.6) 31.7
2012 Allen Parkc 28,210 588 (2.1) 2,274 (8.1) 24,643 (87.4) 6.0
2013 Benton Harborc 10,038 8,899 (88.7) 220 (2.2) 641 (6.4) 44.8
2013 Flintc 102,434 57,451 (56.1) 3,976 (3.9) 36,537 (35.7) 35.5
2013 Detroitc 713,777 586,573 (82.2) 48,679 (6.8) 55,604 (7.8) 33.9
2013 Hamtramckc 22,423 4,285 (19.1) 328 (1.5) 11,876 (53.0) 37.5
2013 Lincoln Parkc 38,144 2,172 (5.7) 5,676 (14.9) 29,102 (76.3) 15.6
Note:
a Data from 1990 Decennial Census.
b Data from 2000 Decennial Census.
c Race and ethnicity data from 2010 Decennial Census; poverty data from the 2009-2013 ACS. We used data from the categories for “White alone/ not Hispanic or Latino”; “Black or
African American alone/ not Hispanic or Latino”; and “Hispanic or Latino/ all races”. Poverty category was “Families/ income below poverty level,” for all family categories.
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Cities in America's Rust Belt, a region that encompasses Midwestern
states such as Michigan, continue to grapple with prolonged economic
stagnation and decline that stem from business loss and relocation,
among other factors (Alder, Lagakos, & Ohanian, 2014). In the seminal
book on the Origins of the Urban Crisis, Sugrue (2005) demonstrates
how industrialized cities, such as Detroit, were especially hard hit
after corporate decisions to relocate plants and to automate production
shrank industrial employment. The impact of employment loss was es-
pecially devastating for African Americans because historical redlining
policies restricted financial lending on the basis of race, and restrictive
covenants forbade the sale of homes to racial minorities. These factors
contributed to highly segregated neighborhoods and lack of geographic
mobility for the African American community in particular. Other poli-
cies that subsidized the construction of interstates and residential sub-
urbs incentivized continued white flight away from urban areas thus
further isolating communities of color, particularly low-income individ-
uals, in urban areas (Massey &Denton, 1993; Sugrue, 2005). Thus, at the
same time that racial minorities began to gain political power in urban
areas, their access to financial resources declined. In many Rust Belt cit-
ies these changes, combined with ongoing reductions in federal and
state revenue-sharing with municipalities and the recent housing fore-
closure crisis (Coe, 2008; Kasdan, 2016; Scorsone, 2014), have culmi-
nated to create severe, multifaceted municipal economic crises that
local leaders found difficult to manage via available policy mechanisms
(e.g., raising taxes).
The use of EM laws to respond to financial crises is not a new phe-
nomenon; it began during the Great Depression. In fact, EM laws are rel-
atively common: At least 16 states have some form of EM mechanism,
among them Rhode Island, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and Ohio
(Scorsone, 2014). Recently the Governor of New Jersey appointed an
EM to address a fiscal crisis in Atlantic City, New Jersey (McGeehan,
2015). Several states have special legislation that addresses state inter-
vention in a local fiscal crisis on a case-by-case basis (Anderson, 2012;
Scorsone, 2014). Scorsone (2014) discusses in detail the economic fac-
tors that activate EM laws. Broadly, these laws may come into effect
when a city is at risk of defaulting on debt or pension payments or has
insufficient cash to make payroll or bond payments (Scorsone, 2014).
The solution to such financial emergencies focuses upon the alleviationof fiscal problems through a reduction in local spending, implemented
by a state-appointed emergency manager. Structural problems, such
as the loss of revenue through the declines in tax base, population,
state revenue sharing, and industrial unemployment, are largely ig-
nored (Fasenfest & Pride, 2016).
Though EM laws are not a recent development, they are prompting
new questions about appropriate policy responses to financial emer-
gencies in distressed urban areas (Anderson, 2012; Scorsone, 2014;
Skidmore & Scorsone, 2011). The attainment of social justice requires
both a fair process in which the people who are impacted by policy
have influence in shaping it as well as the fair distribution of resources
(Reisch & Garvin, 2016). Using a social justice perspective, we summa-
rize some of the critiques of EM laws and processes.
Procedurally, key components of economic restructuring under EM
laws may involve development and implementation of a new financial
and operations planwithout requiring democratic consent from, or con-
sultation with, the public or its elected officials (Anderson, 2012; Loh,
2015). Thus, some argue that EM laws reflect undemocratic processes
that privilege a market-oriented logic that uses technocratic, “expert”-
driven (i.e., the state-appointed emergency manager) decision-making
processes, as opposed to decisions reached by democratically elected
city government officials, who are often local residents and at a mini-
mum are accountable to local residents through the democratic voting
process (Lewis, 2013). Many question whether it is fair for states to
use power to strip mayors and city councils of most of their governing
power, as often occurswhen EM laws are in effect. Loh (2015) describes
EM laws in Michigan as an “unprecedented interruption of elected city
government” (pg. 2). In addition, there are concerns that an emergency
manager is able to renegotiate, terminate, or modify labor contracts,
thus potentially weakening the influence of organized labor (Lewis,
2013).
Distributionally, EM laws require cuts to public expenses in order to
balance city budgets. Perhaps the most extreme example of this ap-
proach came to light in 2015 as a result of the Flint water crisis. In the
Flint case, an emergency manager switched the city's water source
from the Detroit-supplied Lake Huron pipeline to an alternative water
source supplied by the Flint River—a cost-savingmeasure that culminat-
ed in contaminated water and even lead poisoning among the people
of Flint (Hanna-Attisha, LaChance, Sadler, & Schnepp, 2016). Despite
protests from residents, the emergency manager would not allow the
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tors, the financial costs of doing so.
1.2. Study rationale
Embedded in a social justice perspective and using amixedmethods
methodology, the present study examines the dynamics of EM laws,
focusing—for several reasons—on their implementation in Michigan.
Michigan has used EM laws to respond to fiscal crises more extensively
than any other state; starting in 2008, 10 Michigan cities were placed
under emergency management (see Table 1). Though many states use
some form of EM in times of fiscal crises, Scorsone (2014), pg. 5 notes
that Michigan has been widely scrutinized for “being among the
nation's most aggressive in granting extensive powers to an emergency
manager.” Michigan's extensive use of EM laws enabled the research
team to examine use of EM laws through multiple lenses (e.g., histori-
cally, quantitatively, and ethnographically), described in the Method
section below. In so doing, this study sheds light on thepolitical process-
es that gave rise to implementation of EM laws in urban areas in Mich-
igan as well as race and ethnic disparities in the impacts of the EM law.
2. Method
Ourmixedmethods approach utilizes historical policy data gathered
from the state of Michigan, analysis of U.S. Census and American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) data, and a qualitative case study of a neighbor-
hood community organization in one Detroit neighborhood. We first
compiled a chronology of legislative processes that documents the leg-
islative history of EM laws in Michigan from the mid-1980s to the pres-
ent. Then, we identified 12 Michigan municipalities that have had
at least one emergency manager since 1988; several cities have had
multiple emergency managers operating at different time points
(e.g., Ecorse, Hamtramck, Highland Park and Flint) (see Table 1). We
used data gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau and the ACS to examine
the demographic characteristics of cities under EM, mainly focusing on
racial and ethnic groups and family poverty, to better understand who
is most impacted by EM laws.
To complement our historical chronology and quantitative data, we
present an ethnographic case study that examines how the dynamics of
political decision-making in Detroit changed while under EM, thereby
limiting local influence. The case involves a grassroots community orga-
nization based in the low-income, industrialized southwest Detroit
neighborhood of Delray. Data presented in this case study were collect-
ed as part of a broader research project conducted during 2011–2014
and used participant observation, interviews (n = 77) with residents,
elected officials, social service providers, and lobbyists, as well as
media content analysis. Neither the larger community case study nor
the community-based campaign was originally focused on the issue of
emergency management. However, as the campaign progressed, the
state financial takeover of Detroit resulted in (perhaps unintended)
consequences that further constrained residents' political influence,
effectively blocking their ability to secure local investments that
would mitigate environmental health impacts within the host neigh-
borhood. See Krings (2015) for more information on the case and its
methodology.
3. Results
3.1. Emergency management legislation in Michigan: chronology of
legislation
The EM system permits state-appointed officials to replace local
elected officials, such as city councils ormayors, and to havewidespread
fiscal authority with limited connection to residents. In this section, we
provide a brief policy history of Michigan's Local Financial Stability andChoice Act of 2012 (Public Act 436; Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1541-
141.1575) – better known as the EM law.
In the state ofMichigan, legislation that allows the use of state power
to intervene during times of fiscal crises dates from the 1960s. Themore
immediate predecessor of the current EM law is the 1988 Local Govern-
ment Fiscal Responsibility Act or Public Act 101 of 1988 (PA 101,
repealed 1990;Mich Comp. Laws § 141.1101-141.1118). PA 101 provid-
ed the structure that allowed the state to intervene when local munici-
palities were found to be in financial distress. PA 101 included language
that allowed for the governor to assign a local emergency financialman-
ager. This law defined the financial conditions that would trigger state
intervention.
PA 101 was followed by the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1990 or Public Act 72 (PA 72, repealed 2012; Mich Comp. Laws
§ 141.1201-141.1291). PA 72 expanded the scope of EM laws and
allowed for state receivership to include public school districts
(Bowman, 2013). PA 72 allowed EMs to control financial decisions, for
example, revising and creating city budgets and approving spending de-
cisions. Although EMs had considerable fiscal responsibility under PA
72, governance remained in the hands of local elected officials.
The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act
of 2011 (Public Act 4; Mich Comp. Laws § 141.1501-141.1531) became
Michigan's third municipal takeover statute (Bowman, 2013). This leg-
islative effort expanded EM powers beyond financial decision-making.
As such, the title was shifted from “emergency financial manager” to
“emergency manager” (Bowman, 2013). The title change reflects the
expansion of EM powers and shift from emergency financial manager
to simply an emergency manager. Under PA 4, emergency managers
were able to modify collective bargaining agreements, suspend
collecting bargaining for up to five years, remove pension board mem-
bers, and other changes (Arsen & Mason, 2013; Bowman, 2013). Fur-
thermore, PA 4 granted the state governor further autonomy in
appointing an EM, allowing for the appointment of EMs “without the
advice and consent of the senate and without input required from
other government officials, elected or appointed” (Bowman, 2013,
pg. 7).
PA 4was passed by theMichigan State Legislature and signed by the
governor in six weeks, largely eliminating the potential for voter input.
Following its passage, citizens circulated a petition to repeal PA 4 as a
referendumon the state ballot. PA 4was rejected by voters and repealed
by popular vote in the General Election of 2012 (Bowman, 2013). As a
result of the repeal of PA 4, PA 72 temporarily went back into effect.
However, fiveweeks after PA 4was repealed by popular vote, theMich-
igan State Legislature revised and passed a new bill, the Local Financial
Stability and Choice Act of 2012 (Public Act 436; Mich. Comp. Laws §
141.1541-141.1575), which retained the emergency management
model of PA 4. PA 436 was approved by the governor and went into ef-
fect in March 2013.
3.2. Race, class, and emergency management: quantitative analysis
We focus on the–time period beginning in 2008 for several reasons.
This time period included an extended period of recovery from the
2007–2008 economic recession and the federal government bail out of
the automotive industry. As discussed in the legislative chronology,
this time period coincides with substantial expansion of EM powers
by state policy makers. Furthermore, during this time period state offi-
cials made more extensive use of EM laws than at any other time,
with 10 cities under EM, including the historic Detroit bankruptcy nego-
tiations that were conducted under Detroit emergency manager Kevyn
Orr. (see Table 1).
We used 2010 Census data and 2009-2013 ACS data to examine race
and ethnicity, focusing on the three largest race and ethnic groups in
Michigan, and family poverty rates of Michigan cities that experienced
emergency management intervention beginning in 2008. Overall,
as noted in Table 2, based on 2010 Census numbers, the Michigan
Table 2
Racial Distribution of Emergency Management Laws in Michigan, 2008 – 2013.
Total Black or African American Hispanic or Latino White/Non-Hispanic
Michigan 9,883,640 1,383,756 (14.0%) 436,358 (4.4%) 7,569,939 (76.6%)
Cities Under EM Only 998,403 705,708 (70.7%) 72,498 (7.3%) 180,447 (18.1%)
Under EM / Michigan Population 10.10% 51.0% 16.6% 2.4%
Note: EM= emergencymanagement. All data in this table from the 2010 Decennial Census. We used data from the categories for “White alone/ not Hispanic or Latino”; “Black or African
American alone/ not Hispanic or Latino”; and “Hispanic or Latino/ all races”.
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lation was Black or African American, and 4.4% was Hispanic or Latino.
Based on our analysis (Tables 1 and 2), 10.1% of all Michigan residents
lived in cities that were under emergency management at some point
from 2008 - 2013. Of the 10.1% of Michigan residents under emergency
management, 70.7% were African American and 7.3% were Hispanic or
Latino. By contrast, 18.1% of the population under emergency manage-
ment was White. Thus, both African American and Hispanic or Latino
populations were overrepresented in cities under EM, whereas Whites
were clearly underrepresented.
Furthermore, as seen in Table 2, we examined how the demographic
characteristics of those under EM compared to the state level demo-
graphic profile. African Americans comprised 14% ofMichigan's popula-
tion. Yet, compared to their total representation in the Michigan
population, 51% of African Americans in Michiganwere under an emer-
gencymanager at some point from 2008 - 2013. The Hispanic or Latinos
population comprised just 4.4% of theMichigan population. Yet, theHis-
panic or Latino population was also overrepresented, with 16.6% of all
Michigan Hispanic or Latinos under EM at some point during 2008-
2013. In contrast, during the same time period, although non-Hispanic
Whites were 76.6% of Michigan residents, only 2.4% of Whites in the
state were under an emergency manager.
Additionally, ACS data (5-year estimates for 2009-2013) indicated
that the poverty level for all families in Michigan was 12%. Cities
under EM laws had much higher poverty rates than the state as a
whole (Table 1). For example, the poverty levels for families were
37.5% in Hamtramck, 44.8% in Benton Harbor, and 40.3% in Highland
Park. Only Allen Park and Three Oaks had family poverty rates that
were similar to or lower than the state average. Allen Park's financial
hardship resulted not only from the historical trends previously de-
scribed (relocation of industry, urban sprawl, decline in federal and
state revenue sharing), but also from a “failed movie studio develop-
ment project” (Williams, 2012) from which the small city could not
recover.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as indicated in the chronology pre-
sented in Table 1, numerous cities (Ecorse, Hamtramck, Highland Park,
and Flint) have had more than one bought of emergency management.
This suggests that the EM systemmay not effectively solve the problems
that is intended to fix.
3.3. Community organizing and emergency management: an ethnographic
case study
In Detroit, the EM law was activated in response to a severe and
worsening fiscal crisis. According to the Detroit Free Press, following
the economic recession the city had $18 billion in liabilities; possessed
78,000 blighted buildings; and devoted 4 of every 10 dollars to debt,
pensions, and retiree health care rather than necessary city services
(Bomey, Gallagher, & Stryker, 2014). InMarch 2013,MichiganGovernor
Rick Snyder appointed Kevyn Orr as the emergencymanager of Detroit.
In July 2013, Detroit became the largest American city to declare bank-
ruptcy when Orr filed for municipal bankruptcy in U.S. District Court in
Detroit (no author, Detroit Free Press, 2014; Zavattaro, 2014). To dem-
onstrate the mechanism through which the EM law curtails local de-
mocracy and social welfare provision, we present a case study of a
Southwest Detroit neighborhood's Community Benefits Coalitioncampaign to promote local investment in exchange for hosting a new
international border crossing, and how the Detroit emergencymanager
played a role in thwarting their efforts to obtain a Community Benefits
Agreement, or CBA.
Discussion of constructing a new international border crossing
bridge to link the United States and Canada dated back to 2008, when
a team of representatives from the United States, Canada, Michigan,
and Ontario proposed to construct a new border crossing and interstate
that would streamline growing international trade. The team acknowl-
edged that the new bridge would result in environmental health
impacts within its host community. Although it considered many
host neighborhoods up and down the border, the team ultimately de-
cided that the U.S. leg of the crossingwould land in the heavily industri-
alized, low-income southwest Detroit neighborhood of Delray (Krings,
2015).
Following the announcement, many residents stated that they were
not surprised by the decision because somany other locally undesirable
land uses were already placed in the neighborhood, including the
region's wastewater treatment plant. Furthermore, they believed that
their neighborhood was targeted because its residents are predomi-
nately poor racial minorities who lack political influence (Krings,
Spencer, & Jimenez, 2013). According to the ACS 5-Year Estimates
(2009–2013), 17.3% of Delray residents were Black or African American,
29% were of Hispanic or Latino origin, and 31% were White. 21% of
Delray residents were foreign born. Approximately 40% of Delray
households lived in poverty and one-third were female-headed house-
holds. Furthermore, the Delray community is young - 29% of Delray res-
idents are age 19 or younger. Residents of Delray experience some of the
poorest health outcomes for children in Michigan. For example, the
asthma rate in Southwest Detroit is three times higher than the state av-
erage, and its rate of preventable hospitalization among children was
the highest in the city (Tanner-White & Lam, 2010; University of
Michigan Urban and Regional Planning Program, 2007; Schlanger,
2016).
While someDelray residents and business owners dreamed that the
new bridge would bring investment, others held a litany of concerns.
The residents, business owners, and faith leaders who would be
displaced by the bridge and customsplazawondered if eminent domain
lawswould compensate them adequately and some, particularly the el-
derly, did not want to bemoved. Some viewed the new bridge as an ex-
ample of environment injustice. Residents who would stay in the
neighborhood pointed to the high rates of childhood asthma in the
neighborhood and feared that the new bridge, with its attendant rise
in traffic, diesel emissions, and noise pollution, would harm the health
of children whose lungs were still developing.
Believing that it would be impossible to prevent the new crossing,
community stakeholders organized to pursue a community benefits
agreement, or CBA. CBAs typically result from a bargain in which a com-
munity coalition agrees to support a new development in exchange for
investment in the community (Parks & Warren, 2009). Stakeholders in
the community learned about CBAs thatwere obtained in Los Angeles to
mitigate harm related to the L.A. airport and port, for example. Thus,
Delray neighborhood residents were optimistic that a CBA could pro-
duce local investments in services for children, such as schools and
health clinics, as well as affordable housing, access to clear and timely
information, and local accountability relating to the project. For
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tion of additional air quality monitoring systems as well as an air condi-
tioning system within the neighborhood's only remaining school.
From its 2008 inception until 2012, Southwest Detroit Community
Benefits Coalition lobbied city, state, national, and even Canadian offi-
cials for a CBA. In 2012, despite their efforts, Michigan Governor Rick
Snyder and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper signed an agree-
ment to build the bridge, without specific local investments. The Com-
munity Benefits Coalition's political leverage dwindled and the
neighborhood's decline accelerated.
In 2014, a new political opportunity emerged for the coalition. To
build the new crossing, Michigan needed to purchase land that the
city had obtained through tax foreclosures. Coalitionmembers, in coop-
eration with their city council member, lobbied the Detroit Mayor and
City Council to include a provision in the land sale that the $1.4 million
sale price would be invested back into Delray. The Detroit City Council
unanimously agreed with the plan and passed a bill to sell the city
land, on the condition that it included local investments to Delray
(Guillen, 2014).
However, following the Detroit City Council's approval of the land
sale, Kevyn Orr—who, as noted earlier, had been appointed emergency
manager of Detroit in 2013— proposed an alternative plan that did not
include a commitment to Delray. As an emergencymanager, Orr and his
team were focused on paying down Detroit's fiscal debt. Thus, rather
than investing in declining neighborhoods, their main interest was in
paying off the city's creditors. Under the Michigan EM law, the actions
of the Mayor and City Council were advisory and are not binding; ulti-
mately, Orr was under no obligation, politically or otherwise, to enact
the plan approved by Detroit City Council. Under the legislative provi-
sions of the EM law, the emergencymanager alone determines the con-
tracts and agreements the City enters into. Ultimately, a state
emergency loan board considered the two plans and chose the one pro-
posed by Orr, justifying its decision by stating that under EM law, provi-
sions could not be placed upon the sale of city assets. The Community
Benefits Coalition and its city council member were stunned. Not only
did the community lose the opportunity for investment through the
land sale, the democratic process had been undermined by anunelected
emergency manager who prioritized the city's credit over local health
and wellbeing (Felton, 2014).
In November 2014, the Detroit bankruptcy was settled in U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court. In December 2014, Kevyn Orr resigned as EM of Detroit. In
2015,whenOrr officially stepped down and theMayor regained author-
ity, the Community Benefits Coalition returned to the City, again asking
for local investment. At the time of publication, some city money has
been invested in tearingdownblighted buildingswithin the community
and the coalition continues to advocate for investment through other
means.
4. Discussion
The use of EM laws is increasingly widespread, but they are not well
understood by practitioners in social service settings. In this article, we
describe EM laws and their implementation during a period of econom-
ic distress in one Rust Belt state –Michigan. The purpose of this article is
not to argue that fiscal intervention is or was unwarranted in cities
governed by EM laws. Indeed, many of the cities – inMichigan and else-
where –where EM laws have been implemented have suffered from se-
vere, prolonged economic distress that deeply affected the basic
functions of city government, to the detriment of the citizens in those
areas (Zavattaro, 2014). Rather, our goal was to examine these policies
from a social justice perspective, by showing that EM laws have a dis-
proportionate impact on vulnerable and oppressed populations, includ-
ing racial and ethnic minorities, and families living in poverty. We
question how the continued use of EM policies may affect the ability
of the urban poor and minorities to exert political power and, ultimate-
ly, to promote residents' health and wellbeing. We argue that thecontinued disenfranchisement of urban populations is a topic of central
concern for social service providersworking in urban communitieswith
vulnerable and oppressed populations.
Anderson (2012) argues that EM laws reflect “ ‘democratic dissolu-
tion’… changes that suspend local democracy, even though the city re-
mains a legal entity.… [it] preserves the municipal corporation but
suspends its government” (Anderson, 2012, pg. 581). Indeed, as we de-
scribe in the chronology of EM law legislation, the legislative process
that put the EM law into place in Michigan ignored the will of the citi-
zens. When a statewide ballot initiative to repeal PA 4 was approved
by the majority of Michigan voters, the Michigan State Legislature
circumvented the legislative process and enacted PA 436, which
retained the widespread powers of the emergency management pro-
cess of PA 4, doing so through the use of an Appropriations bill which
cannot be subject to repeal through statewide referendum. And, unlike
a city mayor or city council, the governor-appointed decision-maker is
under no direct mandate to respond to local pressure. In this way, EM
laws limit citizen input in favor of an unelected manager and his or
her staff, whom, it can be argued, often make decisions motivated by
cutting costs rather than promoting the health and wellbeing of
residents.
Our analyses of Census data show that EM laws disproportionally af-
fect race and ethnicminority residents of urban areaswith higher-than-
average poverty rates. A startling 51% of African Americans residing in
Michigan have been under the governance of EM laws at some point
since 2008. Hispanic or Latinos were also overrepresented relative to
the state demographic profile, with 16.6% of the Hispanic or Latino pop-
ulation under EMeven though theywere only 4.4% of theMichiganpop-
ulation. Even more shocking, in a state that is majority non-Hispanic
White (76.6%), only 2.4% of Whites statewide were ever directly
under the governance of an emergency manager during the same time
period.
An implication of this descriptive analysis is that a majority of Afri-
can Americans in Michigan have been denied the local control typically
available through democratically elected city council and mayoral au-
thority. These data indicate that it is simply not possible to argue that
these policies are “race neutral,” as the impact is almost exclusively
borne by race and ethnic minority populations in Michigan. When
viewed in the context of the legacies of racial discrimination in the
U.S. (e.g., Sugrue, 2005), we must question how these policies serve as
a structural factor contributing to continued racial inequality and the
disenfranchisement and disempowerment of the urban poor and
minorities.
Because EM laws are intended to address fiscal crises, it may not be
surprising that families living in poverty are also disproportionality af-
fected by EM laws. Nonetheless, the numbers are again striking. Nearly
all Michigan cities governed by EM laws had poverty rates for families
that were double - and even triple - the state poverty rate for families
(12%). Here again is evidence that the impact of EM laws are dispropor-
tionately borne by marginalized groups – including socioeconomically
disadvantaged families –who are historically the least able to exert po-
litical power.
The case study of Delray is one example of how the system of emer-
gency management affects the health and wellbeing of children and
families. Without the Mayor or City Council to advocate on their behalf,
the citizens of Delray had little opportunity to leverage CBA investment.
In the case of Delray, the CBA included community residents efforts to
protect their children's health from the increased pollution that was
likely to result from the placement of an international bridge crossing
in their neighborhood. Despite residents' efforts, the EM procedures
were one factor that blocked their efforts to obtain a CBA. Had they
been successful, the CBA would have provided funds to protect
children's health from increased pollution associated with the new in-
ternational bridge crossing. We argue that this is one example of how
the systemof emergencymanagement removed opportunities for dem-
ocratic participation in city politics and, in so doing, limited the political
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wellbeing.
As noted in the introduction, another example of the impact of such
policies on the health and wellbeing of children and families is the Flint
water crisis. In an effort to savemoney, in 2014 the City of Flint switched
its water source from the Detroit-supplied Lake Huron pipeline to an al-
ternative water source supplied by the Flint River (Hanna-Attisha et al.,
2016). The decision to switch to an alternative water source was made
while Flint was under the leadership of an emergency manager
appointed by the Michigan governor. The Flint emergency manager
played a key role in initiating and approving the decision to switch to
an alternative water source. Little consideration was given to protests
from Flint City residents nor to the evidence suggesting health-related
concerns resulting from the water source switch until a local pediatri-
cian and her colleagues issued a report that documented that the
blood lead levels of children in some Flint neighborhoods more than
doubled subsequent to the water source switch (Hanna-Attisha et al.,
2016). Exposure to environmental contaminants such as lead is likely
to contribute to long-term negative ramifications for children's health
(Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016; Trentacosta, Davis-Kean, Mitchell, Hyde, &
Dolinoy, 2016). Lead exposure in pregnant women is also linked to
fetal death, reduced birth weight, as well as numerous negative health
and behavioral outcomes in young children (Hanna-Attisha et al.,
2016). Additionally, a recent review describes how contaminants in
the physical environment such as lead may alter the development of
the growing brain, perhaps contributing to outcomes such as poorer ac-
ademic outcomes and decreased executive functioning in young chil-
dren (Trentacosta et al., 2016).
Grassroots organizing and residents' alliances with researchers like
Dr. Attisha’s report (2016) facilitated the documentation and dissemi-
nation of evidence relating to the dangers associated with the Flint
water. In October 2015, after 18 months of the EM justifying his refusal
to return to the Detroit water system by stating that it was cost prohib-
itive to do so, the governor approved the decision to switch back to the
Detroit water system and, later, he declared a state of emergency due to
the lack of clean water in the city. Despite international media attention
and widespread concern about the health consequences of lead expo-
sure to Flint children, the Michigan EM law remains in place.
4.1. Austerity politics and the urban poor
A larger question is whether EM laws address the underlying eco-
nomic conditions that created the specific municipal economic crisis
(Scorsone, 2014; Zavattaro, 2014). While our study does not address
this question, we note that several Michigan cities were governed by
EM laws multiple times, suggesting that the implementation of EM
lawsmay not resolve the underlying economic andmanagement condi-
tions that gave rise to a fiscal “emergency” in the first place (Zavattaro,
2014). In terms of the distribution of public resources, rather than ad-
dressing global political and economic systems that influence local mu-
nicipalities and their budgets, emergency management attempts to
balance budgets by curtailing local services – ultimately, one could
argue, this mistakenly places the blame for fiscal crises on city residents
and local government (e.g., calling out the mismanagement of funds)
without properly acknowledging the effects of long-standing global
economic trends, such as those noted in the introduction (e.g., reloca-
tion of jobs away fromurban centers, “white flight”), conditions that ex-
tend far beyond the control of city residents and local governments.
Rather than hurting creditors' bottom line, emergency management
offloads costs to the most vulnerable (Peck, 2012). Spending fields
that are not defended by powerful constituencies or large voting blocs
are especially vulnerable under such conditions, resulting in the default
targeting of programs for the poor and marginalized. By cutting public
services, governments do not inherently become “leaner” and “more ef-
ficient”. Rather, eliminating public services including schools, health
clinics, streetlights, and parks, risks harming poor children and familiesand, in cases like Delray, creating a de facto abandonment. This culmi-
nates in fewer taxpaying residents and a deeper concentration of pover-
ty. As others have noted, without a sustainable plan to address the
economic health of urban areas with longstanding problems (Loh,
2015), it is entirely possible that cities will again fall into fiscal “emer-
gencies” perpetuating the use of EM laws.
4.2. Study limitations and directions for future research
Our study is intended as a descriptive analysis of EM law implemen-
tation in one Midwestern Rust Belt state. Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey,
Ohio, and other states also have EM policies in place. Interstate compar-
ative analysis of these policies is beyond the scope of the current article.
Thus, a study limitation is that the experience in Michigan may not be
generalizable to conditions in other states. Furthermore, this article
does not make causal arguments; rather our analysis observes that be-
ginning in 2009, EM laws were almost exclusively implemented in
urban, majority-African American cities. Our ethnographic study also
does not seek tomake causal arguments. Because there is no counterfac-
tual, it is possible that the same set of decisions that led to the abandon-
ment of the Delray CBA would have been made regardless of the
presence of the emergency manager. Future studies may wish to ex-
plore EM policies in other states and geographic locations; the applica-
tion and implementation of EM laws or similar practices in settings
other than cities, such as school districts; the perceptions of city resi-
dents, e.g., those who are directly impacted by EM laws, of the benefits
and costs of emergency management laws and practices; and policy al-
ternatives that do not involve the use of EM laws that would contribute
to the fiscal stability of under-resourced urban areas.
5. Conclusion
This present article serves as a caution regarding the use of EM laws
as a tool to address fiscal emergencies. Although it may be unintention-
al, these laws limit local political self-determination and have direct im-
plications for the health and wellbeing of low-income children and
families—especially those living in communities of color. EM laws hin-
der local citizens' ability to meaningfully participate in decision-making
that directly affects their wellbeing and exerts this influence on precise-
ly the populations with the least power in society—that is, minorities
and the urban poor. In the absence of more comprehensive policies to
address underlying social inequalities, EM laws are unlikely to be suc-
cessful in remedying economic distress in urban areas.
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